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Abstract
Since there are multiple parties in collaborative
learning, malicious parties might manipulate the
learning process for their own purposes through
backdoor attacks. However, most of existing
works only consider the federated learning sce-
nario where data are partitioned by samples. The
feature-partitioned learning can be another im-
portant scenario since in many real world appli-
cations, features are often distributed across dif-
ferent parties. Attacks and defenses in such sce-
nario are especially challenging when the attack-
ers have no labels and the defenders are not able
to access the data and model parameters of other
participants. In this paper, we show that even
parties with no access to labels can successfully
inject backdoor attacks, achieving high accuracy
on both main and backdoor tasks. Next, we intro-
duce several defense techniques, demonstrating
that the backdoor can be successfully blocked by a
combination of these techniques without hurting
main task accuracy. To the best of our knowl-
edge, this is the first systematical study to deal
with backdoor attacks in the feature-partitioned
collaborative learning framework.
1. Introduction
Federated Learning (FL) (McMahan et al., 2016; Yang
et al., 2019a) is a collaborative learning framework for
training deep learning models while protecting data pri-
vacy. In (McMahan et al., 2016), data samples are dis-
tributed by different participants thus it can be regarded as
sample-partitioned collaborative learning. However, feature-
partitioned collaborative learning (Yang et al., 2019a; Hu
et al., 2019b; Liu et al., 2019) can be another important
scenario in many real world applications. For example, a
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bank may improve its credit risk model by collaborating
with an E-commerce company having a large overlap of
users. In this case, only the bank has the labels and both
parties have different sets of features.
Many recent works (Bagdasaryan et al., 2018; Bhagoji et al.,
2019; Xie et al., 2020) have shown that unprotected feder-
ated learning is vulnerable to model poisoning. The attacker
manipulates the model’s performance on an attacker-chosen
backdoor task while maintaining the performance of the
main task. For example, the attacker can choose images
with some specified features, then manipulate the model to
misclassify these images into an attacker-chosen category.
In feature-partitioned collaborative learning, it is not clear
yet whether similar attacks can be performed since parties
do not have complete sets of features and labels. And in the
case that backdoor attacks succeed, it is not yet clear how
to defend these attacks.
2. Contributions
In this paper, we show that backdoor attacks can be intro-
duced successfully to the feature-partitioned collaborative
learning by modifying the messages exchanged between
different parties, even at parties with no access to training
labels. The backdoor tasks achieve high accuracy on both
backdoor and main tasks. To defend such backdoor attacks,
we evaluated three defense techniques: adding trainable lay-
ers to active party, adding noise and gradient sparsification.
Our comprehensive experimental evaluations demonstrate
that backdoor attacks can be blocked by a combination of
these techniques.
3. Related Work
(Bagdasaryan et al., 2018) introduced a backdoor attack
to federated learning by replacing the global model with a
targeted poisoning model and discussed effectiveness of de-
fense strategies including differential privacy and anomaly
detection. (Bhagoji et al., 2019) carried out stealthy model
poisoning attack to federated learning by alternatively op-
timizing for stealth and the adversarial objectives. (Xie et
al., 2020) introduced distributed backdoor attacks to fed-
erated learning to decomposes a global attack into several
local ones and demonstrated superior attack performance.
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(Sun et al., 2019) studied backdoor and defense strategies
in federated learning and show that norm clipping and weak
differential privacy mitigate the attacks without hurting the
overall performance. All the works above consider the sam-
ple (horizontally)-partitioned scenario.
Feature-partitioned collaborative learning frameworks have
been developed for models including trees (Cheng et al.,
2019), linear and logistic regression (Yang et al., 2019b;
Hardy et al., 2017; Gratton et al., 2018; Kikuchi et al.,
2017; Hu et al., 2019a), and neural networks (Liu et al.,
2018; Hu et al., 2019b). Privacy-preserving techniques such
as Homomorphic Encryption (HE) (Rivest et al., 1978; Acar
et al., 2018), Secure Multi-party Computation (SMPC) (Yao,
1982) and Differential Privacy (DP) (Dwork, 2006) are typi-
cally applied in these frameworks to preserve user privacy
and data confidentiality. To the best of our knowledge,
model poisoning or backdoor attacks in such a scenario
have not been studied systematically.
4. A Feature-partitioned collaborative
learning framework
Suppose K data owners collaboratively train a machine
learning model based on a set of data {xi, yi}Ni=1 and only
one party has labels. This is a reasonable assumption in
cross-organizational collaborative learning scenarios, be-
cause in reality labels (such as users’ credit scores, patients’
diagnosis etc) are expensive to obtain and only exist in one
or few of the organizations. Suppose that the feature vec-
tor xi can be further decomposed into K blocks {xki }Kk=1,
where each block belongs to one owner. Without loss of
generality, assume that the labels are located in party K.
Then the collaborative training problem can be formulated
as
oKi = f(θ1, . . . , θK ;x
1
i , . . . ,x
K
i ) (1)
min
θ
L(θ;D) = 1
N
N∑
i=1
`(oKi , y
K
i ) + λ
K∑
k=1
γ(θk) (2)
where θk denote the training parameters of the kth party;
Θ = [θ1; . . . ; θK ]; N denote the total number of training
samples; f(·) and γ(·) denote the prediction function and
regularizer and λ is the hyperparameter; Following previous
work, we assume each party adopts a sub-model Gk which
generates local predictions, i. e, local latent representations
Hki and the final prediction is made by merging Hk with an
nonlinear operation, such as softmax function. That is,
Hki = Gk(θk,x
k
i ) (3)
`(θ1, . . . , θK ;Di) = `(f(
K∑
k=1
Hki ), y
K
i ) (4)
Algorithm 1 A feature-partitioned collaborative learning
framework
Input: learning rate η
Output: Model parameters θ1, θ2 ... θK Party 1,2,. . . ,K,
initialize θ1, θ2, ... θK .
for j = 1 to N do
Randomly sample S ⊂ [N ]
for each party k 6= K in parallel do
k computes and sends {Hki }i∈S to party K
end for
party K computes and sends { ∂`∂Hi }i∈S to all other
parties;
for each party k=1,2,. . . ,K in parallel do
k computes∇k` with equation 5
update θj+1k = θ
j
k − η∇k`;
end for
end for
where Gk can adopt a wide range of models such as linear
and logistic regression, support vector machines, neural net-
works etc. Let Hi =
∑K
k=1H
k
i , then the gradient function
has the form
∇k`(θ1, . . . , θK ;Di) = ∂`
∂Hi
∂Hki
∂θk
(5)
We refer to the party having the labels as the active party,
and the rest of parties as passive parties. In a feature-
partitioned collaborative learning protocol, each passive
party sends {Hki } to active party, and the active party calcu-
lates { ∂`∂Hi } and sends it back to passive parties for gradient
update. See Algorithm 1. We use M to denote the model
trained.
5. Backdoor Attacks
5.1. Threat Model
Based on Algorithm 1, we consider the following attack
model: (i) the attacker has access to the training data of
one or more data parties Dm and it controls the training
procedure and local hyperparameters of attacked parties.
(ii) The attacker can modify local updates such as train-
ing weight and gradients before sending transmitted data to
other parties. (iii) The attacker does not control any benign
parties’ training nor does the attacker control the global
communication and aggregation protocols. (iv) Contrary to
traditional data poisoning attacks which focus on poisoning
training data, the attacker in collaborative learning focus
on poisoning gradients and model updates that are commu-
nicated among parties in the protocol, similar to previous
works (Steinhardt et al., 2017). The fundamental differ-
ence between our threat model and the model adopted in
previous works related to backdoor attack in FL (or sample-
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partitioned collaborative learning) is the following. First, in
FL backdoor attacks, the attacker has access to the entire
feature and label space information and the entire set of
model parameters. However, in our scenario, the attacker
only has access to a portion of the feature space of parties
that it controls, and it may not have access to labels if it
doesn’t control the active party. It also has only a portion
of the model parameters of the parties it controls; Secondly,
in FL backdoor attacks, the attacker controls only a por-
tion of the entire dataset and any model updates it sends
get averaged in the server, causing a scale-down effect for
the backdoor. In our setting, the backdoor will take place
over the entire batch dataset in each iteration, and survive
and propagate through the communication protocols. Due
to these differences, the backdoor strategies for feature-
partitioned scenario are fundamentally different from those
for sample-partitioned scenario.
5.2. Adversarial Objectives
The attacker aims to train a model which achieves high
performance on both the original task and the targeted back-
door task. Unlike Byzantine attacks (Mun˜oz-Gonza´lez et al.,
2019), its goal is not to prevent convergence. The targeted
backdoor task is to assign an attacker-chosen label to input
data with a specific pattern (i. e. , a trigger). Unlike attacks
in FL, the poisoned input data appear globally among all
parties with distributed features, as shown in Figure 1.
Since the active party has labels, it can directly modify the
label of the poisoned dataset without affecting the training
protocol. During training, the active party just needs to send
{ ∂Lb∂Hi }instead of { ∂L∂Hi } to successfully inject the attack,
where Lb denotes the loss function of the backdoor task.
Therefore in this work, we focus on a more challenging
scenario, that is to perform attacks at passive party and
defense at active party. This type of attack is more likely to
appear in real-world scenarios.
5.3. Attacks at Passive Party
The difficulty for a passive party to conduct training-time
targeted attack is that it has no access to either labels or
other passive parties’ contributions at every iteration. From
Algorithm 1, the only information the passive parties obtain
is the intermediate gradients { ∂L∂Hi }.
One way to accomplish this attack is to infer labels from
the intermediate gradients { ∂L∂Hi }, and this indeed can be
accomplished in certain scenarios. For example, in equation
4, if f represents a softmax function and ` represents a
cross-entropy loss, then giH =
∂`
∂Hi
is a m-dimension vector
where m is the number of labels with the jth element being:
giH,j =
{
Sj , j 6= y
Sj − 1, j = y
where Sj is the softmax function Sj = e
hj∑
i e
hi
over Hi.
Here we abuse the notation y to denote the index of the true
label. It is now clear that giH reveals the label information
because the yth element of giH will have opposite sign as
compared to others. To inject the attack, the passive party
only needs to replace giH with
gb,iH,j =
{
Sj , j 6= τ
Sj − 1, j = τ
To prevent information leakage, the active party may change
how the intermediate information is aggregated, e.g. by
adding additional hidden layers ( a trainable active party).
If so, labels can no longer be recovered using the above
approach. For such scenarios, we propose an alternative
backdoor attack which will still accomplish the attacker’s
goal without recovering label data.
Gradient-replacement backdoor In this approach, we
assume that the passive attacker knows at least one clean
sample, denoted as Dtarget, which has the same label as the
targeted label of the backdoor task. We use this assump-
tion because it’s usually not too difficult to get the label of
one sample in practice. With this assumption, the attacker
records the received intermediate gradient ofDtarget as grec,
and set the intermediate gradients of the poisoned samples
to be grec, update the model parameters using γgrec
∂Hki
∂θk
according to equation 5, where γ is an adjustable amplify
ratio. See Algorithm 2.
When the active party has trainable parameters as in Fig-
ure 2,it will have the ability to learn the mapping between
the activation value Hi and the true label. Although the
model parameters in the malicious party are changed by
the poisoned gradient and the malicious party will output
the poisoned activation value, the active party would still
be able to establish a new mapping between the poisoned
activation value and the true label, causing the backdoor
task to fail. In this case, for each training sample in Dpoison,
the malicious party can send a random-valued vector to the
active party to prevent the active party from establishing
the mapping between the poisoned activation value and the
true label during training. In the inference time, however,
the poisoned activation values, not the random vector, will
be sent to the active party, thus the active party is likely to
predict this sample as the same label as Dtarget.
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Algorithm 2 Gradient poisoning algorithm
Input:current batch of training dataset X , original gradi-
ent matrix ∂`∂H that the active party sends to the malicious
party, dataset Dtarget, Dpoison, the amplify ratio of the
poisoned gradient γ
Output: poisoned gradient matrix Gpoisoned
Gpoisoned = ∂`∂H
for xi in X do
if xi belongs to Dtarget then
assign the ith row of ∂`∂H to a global variable grec
end if
if xi belongs to Dpoison then
assign γ · grec to the ith row of Gpoisoned
end if
end for
return Gpoisoned
Algorithm 3 Activation blurring algorithm
Input:current batch of training dataset X , original activa-
tion matrix H that the malicious party sends to the active
party, dataset Dpoison
Output:blurred activation matrix Hblurred
Hblurred = H
for xi in X do
if xi belongs to Dpoison then
generate a random value vector hrandom
assign hrandom to the ith row of Hblurred
end if
end for
return Hblurred
6. Defenses
6.1. Validation
Validation data sets are effective for detecting targeted mis-
classification attacks but are not effective when the adver-
sarial model performs well on both the original and the
backdoor task. Thus it is not considered as an overall de-
fense strategy in our study.
6.2. Trainable Active Party
We introduce additional training layers at the active party
for defense. The active party first concatenates the output
of the passive parties then adopts a dense layer of 32 nodes
before the output layer. See Figure 2
6.3. Differential Privacy
Recent works (Bagdasaryan et al., 2018; Xie et al., 2020)
use differential privacy to defense the backdoor attacks in
federated learning. This approach first clips the maliciously
amplified gradients, then adds Gaussian or Laplacian noise
to the gradients. In our experiments, we found that clipping
is not as effective as adding noise to the exchanged messages.
In the next section, we evaluate the effectiveness of defense
at various noise level.
6.4. Gradient Sparsification
Recent works (Zhu et al., 2019) have shown that gradient
sparsification is an effective approach to defense attacks in
federated learning. This approach prunes gradients with
small magnitudes to zero. According to (Lin et al., 2017),
the gradients can be compressed by more than 300× with-
out losing accuracy. We use the gradient sparsification al-
gorithm proposed in (Lin et al., 2017), which adopts a drop
rate at each iteration during training to threshold the gradi-
ents updated. The active party sends the sparsified gradients
for update but accumulates the rest of the gradients locally.
7. Experiments
7.1. Models and Dataset
Models There are two passive parties (party A and party
B) which have different features and one active party (party
C) which has the label. Party B is set to be the malicious
party. Note party A and C can be the same party as well.
See Figure 1. We use tensorflow 2.0 to implement our
experiments. ReLU is used as the activation function for
all the nodes except for the output layer, SGD with default
learning rate 0.01 is used as the optimizer and the batch
size is set to 64. For all the backdoor training experiments,
Algorithm 2 is used to perform the backdoor task, Algorithm
3 is used in case of the active party is trainable, and Gaussian
noise with variance of 1e-6 is used as random vectors in
Algorithm 3. The passive party contains an input layer and
an output layer, the size of the output layer is set to be 32.
NUS-WIDE dataset In this dataset, each sample has 634
image features and 1000 text features which is very suitable
for the feature-partitioned experiments. In this experiment,
we choose [’buildings’, ’grass’, ’animal’, ’water’, ’person’]
as labels in our dataset. Party A gets the image features,
and party B gets text features. We choose the poisoned data
samples as those whose last text feature equals 1. Table 1
shows the label distribution of Dpoison. We can see that
most of the labels of Dpoison belong to animal (class2), but
few of them belong to buildings (class0). So we set the
goal of our backdoor task to change the predicted label of
Dpoison to be buildings (class0). The data samples that
satisfy this feature are less that 1% in both training set and
testing set according to Table 1, thus it’s difficult to detect
this backdoor using a validation set.
MNIST dataset In this dataset, each sample has 28× 28
pixels. We partition the dataset so that party A gets the first
Backdoor attacks and defenses in feature-partitioned collaborative learning
14 rows while party B gets the last 14 rows. We randomly
select 600 samples from the 60000 training samples and
100 samples from the 10000 testing samples, and mark their
pixels in [25,27], [27,25], [26,26] and [27,27] to be 255,
similar to (Gu et al., 2017).
Table 1. comparing number of samples of the backdoor data with
the whole dataset of NUS-WIDE.
ID Label Train Test
0 buildings 3 / 6173 0 / 4213
1 grass 8 / 5981 8 / 4082
2 animal 125 / 12679 81 / 8296
3 water 11 / 12202 4 / 8172
4 person 5 / 22965 9 / 15237
Figure 1. backdoor task settings
(a) active party is not trainable (b) active party is trainable
Figure 2. two types of network structures
7.2. Attacks at Passive Party
Figure 3 shows the distribution of the prediction accuracy of
Dpoison for normal and backdoor training. We can see that
although Dpoison has few samples belonging to class0, the
prediction score of class0 is much higher than other classes,
which means the backdoor task is succeeded.
After each training epoch, we used Dpoison to check the
accuracy of the backdoor task and the testing set to check
the accuracy of the main task. Figure 4 shows the results for
(a) normal(NUS-WIDE) (b) poisoned(NUS-WIDE)
(c) normal(MNIST) (d) poisoned(MNIST)
Figure 3. average prediction score of Dpoison
(a) MNIST (b) MNIST
(c) NUS-WIDE (d) NUS-WIDE
Figure 4. comparing normal training with backdoor training when
the active party is not trainable.
various γ. We can see that for a reasonable range of γ, both
the backdoor task and normal task maintain high accuracy,
indicating a successful injection of backdoor. The gap be-
tween the normal task and the backdoor task is not obvious,
so it is hard to detect this backdoor using a validation set.
The main task and the backdoor task both work well when
γ equals 10, thus we set γ to be 10 in the following experi-
ments.
7.3. Defenses at Active Party
Trainable active party Figure 5 shows that the backdoor
task failed in MNIST but succeeded in NUS-WIDE. Ta-
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(a) MNIST (b) MNIST
(c) NUS-WIDE (d) NUS-WIDE
Figure 5. comparing normal training with backdoor training when
active party is trainable.
Table 2. accuracy of different network.
MNIST NUS-WIDE
untrainable active party 95.7% 88.5%
trainable active party 97.1% 88.7%
ble 2 shows the accuracy of the main task also improved
by this network structure. Although this defense strategy
failed on NUS-WIDE, we can combine it with other defense
techniques.
(a) Gaussian noise (b) Gaussian noise
(c) Laplacian noise (d) Laplacian noise
Figure 6. comparing noisy training with different variances when
active party is trainable on NUS-WIDE.
Differential Privacy Since the backdoor task failed on
MNIST with trainable active party already, we did experi-
ments on NUS-WIDE with trainable active party. Gaussian
noise and Laplacian noise with different variances were
added and compared. This experiment is repeated 20 times
in order to alleviate the effect of randomness. Figure 6
shows that noise with variances larger than 0.05 obviously
alleviated the backdoor task. However, it also hurts the
accuracy of the main task.
(a) NUS-WIDE (b) NUS-WIDE
Figure 7. comparing gradient sparsification training with different
drop rate s. (a)-(d) is performed when the active party is not
trainable, (e)-(f) is performed when the active party is trainable.
Gradient Sparsification We then evaluate this strategy
for NUS-WIDE with trainable active party where differen-
tial privacy compromises the main task accuracy. Figure 7
show the effectiveness of defenses at various sparsification
levels, adjusted by the drop rate s. We show that gradient
sparsification can mitigate the backdoor without hurting the
accuracy of the main task.
8. Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper we show that backdoor task can be performed
by the passive party without accessing the labels in the
feature-partitioned collaborative learning framework. For
defense, it’s recommended to use a trainable active party,
which can alleviate the leakage of label information and
improve the model performance. Gradient sparsification
can further enhance the effectiveness of defenses without
hurting the performance of main task. Future work may
focus on study of additional types of attacks and defenses
aiming to achieve better understanding of security in feature-
partitioned collaborative learning.
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